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What is a voluntary act?
When we consider the movements that people make, there 
is a fundamental distinction between reflexes and volun-
tary acts. Reflex movements occur completely outwith our 
control. For example, we cannot make our pupil contract 
by thought alone and we cannot stop it contracting when it 
is illuminated. In contrast, a voluntary act involves a move-
ment that we can choose to make (or not), deliberately and 
by thought alone. There are, of course, movements that lie 
between these two extremes. For example, we can choose 
to blink, but we cannot stop a blink occurring as a reflex-
ive response to a puff of air to the eye. Nevertheless, we 
experience most of the actions in our daily repertoire as 
voluntary.
However, defining voluntary acts as behaviour over 
which we have control leads to many deep philosophical 
problems. In what sense do we control our behaviour? Does 
such control imply the possibility of mental causation and 
the existence of free will? Is free will compatible with a 
materialist approach to the study of behaviour? Is this truly 
free behaviour uniquely human?
I believe many of these problems arise from mixing up 
different perspectives on action. There are two ways to 
look at voluntary actions. If we want to study animals or 
humans who cannot communicate, then we have to define 
voluntary actions on the basis of behaviour (the third-person 
perspective). But, through introspection, we can also define 
voluntary actions in terms of experience (the first-person 
perspective). As we shall see, these two perspectives tell 
very different stories about voluntary actions.
Abstract Volition can be studied from two perspec-
tives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour 
is internally generated, rather than being determined by 
the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to 
some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique 
to humans, since it is seen in many other species including 
invertebrates. From the first-person view, our experience of 
volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of agency. We 
feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to hap-
pen and we can choose between different actions. Our expe-
rience of agency is not direct. It depends on sub-personal 
inferences derived from prior expectations and sensations 
associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and 
intuitions about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. 
Nevertheless, our experience of agency is not a mere epi-
phenomenon. Anticipation of the regret we might feel after 
making the wrong choice can alter behaviour. Furthermore, 
the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, 
has a critical role in creating social cohesion and group ben-
efits. We can only study the experience of agency in humans 
who can describe their experiences. The discussion of the 
experience of volition, that introspection and communica-
tion make possible, can change our experience of volitional 
actions. As a result, agency, regret and responsibility are 
cultural phenomena that are unique to humans.
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Volition from the third-person perspective
For an outside observer, the key feature of a voluntary act 
as opposed to a reflex is that the voluntary act cannot be 
fully predicted from the preceding context. The implication 
is that, if the behaviour is not being determined by exter-
nal events, then the choices must be made ‘from inside’, 
endogenously.
Unpredictable behaviour
The matter of predictability has played a major role in the 
design of many experiments in which attempts have been 
made to manipulate the degree of voluntariness associated 
with an action. For example, in one condition, the subject’s 
responses might be entirely determined by an external 
stimulus (press the left key when the red light goes on). In 
the other condition, subjects might be told, press whichever 
key you like when the light goes on (e.g. Frith et al. 1991). 
In this latter condition, each choice is not determined by 
any external stimulus and cannot easily be predicted. The 
actions in both conditions are clearly voluntary in the sense 
that subjects could choose not to follow the experimenter’s 
instructions, but, assuming that the instructions are obeyed, 
the second, unconstrained condition is clearly more volun-
tary and more ‘free’ than the first. Libet’s classic experiment 
(Libet et al. 1983) on ‘a freely voluntary act’ is based on the 
same principle, except here the precise time of the act that is 
chosen by the subject and that is difficult to predict.
When subjects have to make free choices, activity is typi-
cally seen in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region that 
seems to be involved in selecting actions when there are a 
number of competing possibilities (Jenkins et al. 2000; Frith 
2000). By definition, the greatest possible unpredictability is 
achieved by making choices at random, and indeed, random 
behaviour is perceived as being more ‘free’ (Ebert and Weg-
ner 2011). Thus, since free choice is related to unpredict-
ability, it is not surprising to find that performing a task in 
which subjects are specifically instructed to try and generate 
random sequences elicits activity in the same brain regions 
as tasks involving ‘free choice’ (Jahanshahi et al. 2000).
There are many reasons why behaving randomly may 
not seem a very good way of characterising volitional, free 
behaviour. For one thing, random behaviour does not seem 
to be a very rational way of dealing with the world. In addi-
tion, true randomness is extremely difficult to achieve either 
as a deliberate human endeavour or with mathematical aids. 
Is it possible for a nervous system to generate truly random 
behaviour?
As is so often the case, these intuitive ideas about ran-
domness are quite wrong. There are many competitive 
situations where it is an advantage if others cannot predict 
what you are going to do next. Penalty shots in football 
are an obvious example, and random behaviour is optimal 
when playing zero-sum games such as stone–paper–scis-
sors (Osborne 2004, p. 141). The advantages of random 
behaviour are even more obvious for non-human animals, 
including invertebrates (Brembs 2011). It is a great advan-
tage to a predator if the behaviour of prey is predictable. 
For example, when fish perceive a sudden pressure change 
on one side of their body, they bend in a C-shape away 
from the perceived stimulus to escape in the opposite direc-
tion (C-start response). Taking advantage of this highly pre-
dictable behaviour, the tentacled snake elicits the C-start 
response with one part of its body causing the fish to jump 
into its mouth, which has been positioned in the predicted 
path of the fish (Catania 2009). Predictability is not a good 
strategy for survival, and many species have evolved unpre-
dictable (protean) behaviour as a means of escape (Hum-
phries and Driver 1970). For example, when an air move-
ment is detected, a cockroach escapes away from that side. 
However, the precise angle taken by the animal cannot be 
predicted (Domenici et al. 2008).
If voluntary behaviour is defined in terms of unpredicta-
bility and flexibility, then such behaviour is present in many 
species, including invertebrates, and it follows that the cen-
tral nervous system of these creatures has solved the prob-
lem of generating unpredictable behaviour (Brembs 2011). 
In humans, in association with the development of the pre-
frontal cortex, the ability to select responses in a flexible 
manner is greatly enhanced and, with some deliberate men-
tal effort, can be applied to novel situations. It is this kind 
of flexible behaviour that is engaged in tasks like that of 
Libet in which subjects must freely decide when or how to 
respond (Frith 2000; Roepstorff and Frith 2004). Respond-
ing ‘freely’ in the Libet task can be interpreted as selecting, 
at random, one from of a range of different time intervals.
Endogenous, self-generated behaviour
Unpredictable behaviour is unpredictable precisely because 
it cannot be predicted on the basis of prior external events. 
In this sense, the origin of the behaviour lies in the behaving 
individual rather than in the environment. The behaviour is 
self-generated or endogenous.
In terms of traditional stimulus–response psychology, 
such endogenous behaviour is difficult to explain, since this 
is a response with no eliciting stimulus. In contrast, within 
an engineering framework, such behaviour is perfectly natu-
ral since responses, better termed actions, are seen as inputs 
into the environment, which elicit changes, that is, outputs 
from the environment. Through such actions, we learn about 
the environment.
Such behaviour is captured within the framework of 
instrumental conditioning. In instrumental, or operant, con-
ditioning, the behaviour is determined by the expectation 
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of a valuable outcome. The most famous example of oper-
ant condition is the Skinner box. Here, the behaviour of a 
pigeon pecking a disc is maintained by the consequences 
of this action, receiving food. Through instrumental condi-
tioning, an organism learns that different actions are asso-
ciated with different outcomes. The action chosen is that 
associated with the highest expected outcome in the current 
context (Sutton and Barto 1998). Such choices are self-
generated in the sense that they are determined by internal 
representations of expected values. These representations 
have been formed through previous interactions with the 
environment, but the current choice is not determined by 
some specific environmental stimulus. Instrumental learn-
ing is sometimes described as dealing with the modification 
of ‘voluntary behaviour’. Behaviour that is self-generated 
in this sense is a feature of many animal species and is cer-
tainly not uniquely human.
When we choose an action of the basis of the expected 
outcome, our action may be determined endogenously, but 
it is still determined. We choose the action associated with 
the highest expected value for its outcome. In this sense, 
our action is rational, but it is also highly predictable and, 
in that sense, not ‘free’. There is, however, another param-
eter associated with models currently popular for explaining 
decision-making. This is the explore/exploit parameter (see 
e.g. Cohen et al. 2007). At one extreme of this parameter, 
animals simply exploit the knowledge they have acquired, 
always choosing the action associated with the highest 
expected value. This is resource acquisition. At the other 
extreme, animals do not choose the action with the highest 
value, but explore what happens if other options are chosen. 
This is information acquisition. The explore/exploit param-
eter is particularly relevant when animals are foraging for 
sources of food. Is it better to go to a known food source 
(exploit), or is it better to explore in the hope of finding a 
new and possibly better source? Some exploration will be 
beneficial since a) the food supply in the known location 
may eventually be exhausted and b) without exploration, 
we may remain trapped in a local minimum (to put it in 
mathematical terms) and never discover the better location 
elsewhere.
For social animals, such as bees, it is an advantage for 
the group to have a proportion of individuals engaged in 
exploration. In this way, the group can fully exploit known 
food sources, but also identify new and better sources. In 
bees, there are genetically determined individual differences 
in the propensity to explore, linked to the dopamine sys-
tem. This observation suggests an interesting analogy with 
novelty-seeking behaviour in humans (Liang et al. 2012). 
However, the propensity to explore is also affected by the 
environment. When resource levels are high, exploration is 
more likely to be chosen because, in such an environment, 
this option is less risky (Eliassen et al. 2007).
Exploratory choices are less determined than exploitative 
choices. Indeed, the algorithms used to model such choices 
typically include a random element for making the explora-
tory selection. However, the ability to make exploratory 
choices is clearly not uniquely human and is therefore not 
relevant to an understanding of free will. On the other hand, 
this framework suggests that decision-making and hence 
volition should be conceived of as a hierarchy. At a low 
level, choice is made between different actions. At a higher 
level, the decision is taken whether such choices should 
be made in an exploitative or an exploratory mode. For 
humans, at least, there is indirect evidence that the choice 
to explore depends upon overriding exploitative tenden-
cies and is linked to activity in frontopolar cortex (Daw et 
al. 2006). Exploratory behaviour in humans would then be 
another example of the highly flexible volitional behaviour 
associated with the evolution of the prefrontal cortex.
Predicting endogenous behaviour
Ever since Libet’s innovative experiment, there has been 
great interest in discovering the extent to which it is possible 
to predict someone’s behaviour from the brain activity pre-
ceding the action. For example, Soon et al. (2008) used 
fMRI to show that brain activity occurring several seconds 
prior to the movement predicted better than chance1 the 
choice that subjects would make when the decision to press 
with the left or the right finger was freely chosen. I have 
argued above that tasks of this sort are problematic since, in 
essence, the experimenter is asking her subjects to try to be 
unpredictable and random (Roepstorff and Frith 2004). To 
achieve such behaviour depends on a complex and under-
specified cognitive process.
More straightforward paradigms can be used to contrast 
actions that are controlled endogenously and exogenously. 
In typical discrimination tasks, participants choose which 
response to make on the basis of sensory information. For 
example, Bode et al. (2012) showed participants pictures 
of pianos or chairs. The participants indicated which object 
they thought had been presented by pressing keys with the 
left or right finger. However, the discrimination was made 
difficult by masking the pictures, and on some trials, no pic-
ture was actually present between the masks. When enough 
sensory information is present to discriminate the pictures, 
the choice is determined exogenously by brain events that 
occur immediately after the presentation of the stimulus. 
When, however, there is no sensory information available, 
the choice must be made endogenously, even though the 
participant is not aware of this. These expectations were 
1
 However, the prediction accuracy was only just better than chance 
at about 60 %.
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confirmed by measuring EEG during the performance of the 
task and using this activity to predict the choice made. When 
sensory information was available, the choice could only 
be predicted from brain activity occurring after stimulus 
presentation. In contrast, when no sensory information was 
available, the choice could be predicted from brain activity 
occurring prior to stimulus presentation and therefore also 
prior to the making of the decision. This activity derived 
from the participant’s previous choice history.
The authors suggest that, at the beginning of each trial in 
this object classification task, possible choices are primed on 
the basis of the previous choice history. If sensory informa-
tion about the object becomes available, then this priming 
is overridden and choice is determined by this new infor-
mation. In free choice tasks, where there is no exogenous 
information, choice is determined, to some degree, by what 
has happened in the past and hence prior brain activity can 
predict choice better than chance.
There is direct evidence that unconscious primes can 
influence behaviour in a free choice task. For example, 
Kiesel et al. (2006) used a two-choice reaction time task in 
which some choices were fixed, since a visual stimulus (4 
or 6) indicated which choice should be made, while other 
trials were free since the stimulus (0) indicated that partici-
pants should choose for themselves which choice to make. 
The stimuli were preceded by subliminal stimuli (also 4 or 
6), which primed subjects to choose one or other option. 
There was a significant, though small effect (~5 %) of these 
subliminal primes on the choice made in the free trials. 
Thus, although there are effects of unconscious primes on 
free choices, these biases are often overcome. These prim-
ing effects are too small to prove that our actions, whether 
called voluntary or involuntary, are completely determined 
by our previous history.
When we look at human behaviour from a third-person 
perspective, we can see that it is continuous with behaviour 
in animals. Many creatures perform acts that are volitional 
in the sense that these acts are not determined by immedi-
ate signals in the environment and are therefore difficult to 
predict. Humans are certainly more flexible in their ability 
to generate unconstrained acts, but the basic mechanisms 
for doing this were already in place. If we are to identify 
unique aspect of human volition, then we need to turn to the 
first-person perspective. Indeed, I believe that it is only by 
taking into account the first-person perspective that we can 
properly understand volition.
Volition from a first-person perspective
As well as observing what people do from a third-person 
perspective, we can also ask them about their experience of 
action. This is the first-person perspective on volition. As 
soon as we take the first-person perspective on volition, we 
restrict ourselves to the study of humans. To collect evidence 
from a first-person perspective, we need participants who 
are, first, able to reflect upon their actions and, second, are 
able to communicate the result of such reflection to others. 
These abilities may well be uniquely human (Frith 2012).
The experience of action
Metzinger (2006) has described the experience of volition 
as ‘thin and evasive’. This is because we are rarely aware 
of the sensory consequences of our own actions. For exam-
ple, participants can be given misleading visual feedback 
about the position of their limb when they are controlling 
the position of a cursor on a screen. In order to move the 
cursor straightforward, they may have to move their hand 
slightly to one side. People are unaware of such deviations 
as long as they are less than about 15 degrees (Fourneret and 
Jeannerod 1998). At the sub-personal level (Hornsby 2000), 
the brain takes account of the deviation since the movement 
is appropriately adjusted to ensure that the cursor reaches 
the target. It seems plausible that the sensory consequences 
of action do not normally enter awareness because they are 
predicted on the basis of the commands sent to the motor 
system (Frith et al. 2000). If everything happens as pre-
dicted, the resultant sensations are uninformative and need 
not be at the focus of attention. This is why self-tickling 
generates such minimal and unexciting sensations. On the 
other hand, even a small distortion of the sensory stimula-
tion generated by self-tickling reinstates the tickling sensa-
tion (Blakemore et al. 1999).
We may have little awareness of the sensations associ-
ated with our actions, but, on the other hand, we are vividly 
aware of acting on the world. So what is it about our actions 
that we are aware of? I suggest that, when all is going well, 
we are simply aware of our intention to act and of the effect 
of our action on the world (the outcome) as a check that our 
intention has been fulfilled. This idea is implicit in Libet’s 
famous experiment on voluntary action (Libet et al. 1983). 
Participants were asked to lift their finger ‘whenever they 
had the urge to do so’. They were also asked to introspect 
either on when they had the urge to act (the intention) or 
on when the finger movement occurred (the outcome of the 
intention).
The idea that we are only aware of the intention to act and 
its outcome can make sense of otherwise extremely strange 
abnormalities of awareness of volition that can sometimes 
occur as a consequence of brain damage. After damage to 
the right hemisphere, including the parietal cortex, some 
patients develop anosognosia for hemiplegia (Bisiach et al. 
1986); that is, they are unaware that their left limb is para-
lysed and claim that they can and do move it. This experience 
can be explained as follows. The patients’ motor systems are 
293Exp Brain Res (2013) 229:289–299 
1 3
intact in as far as they can formulate an intention to move 
the paralysed limb. In the normal case, this intention would 
be followed by the outcome of the limb moving. The fail-
ure of the limb to move would normally indicate that some-
thing was wrong with the system. In the case of anosog-
nosia, however, the feedback, indicating that the limb has 
not moved, fails to register. As a result, patients experience 
the intention to move and, in the absence of any evidence 
to the contrary, assume that the movement has taken place. 
Fotopoulou et al. (2008) have recently obtained empirical 
evidence in favour of this account. This explanation requires 
that the visual feedback, indicating that the limb has not 
moved, is not registered. This lack of registration is prob-
ably caused by right parietal lobe damage and the neglect 
of visual signals from the left side of space often associated 
with such damage (Driver and Vuilleumier 2001).
The experience of agency
In a series of very ingenious experiments, Haggard et al. 
have demonstrated that there is an intimate connection 
between these two key aspects of our experience of action: 
the intention and its outcome. It is this connection that is 
the basis of our experience of agency, that is, of being the 
cause of the outcomes of our actions. Haggard et al. studied 
simple actions with consequences, for example pressing a 
button followed after 250 ms by a tone. Using the technique 
pioneered by Libet et al. (1983), participants are asked to 
indicate the time at which they press the button and, on other 
trials, the time at which they hear the tone. The first study in 
this series (Haggard et al. 2002) uncovered the phenomenon 
of intentional binding. Participants experience their action 
and its outcome as being closer together in mental time than 
they are in physical time. Thus, the button press is experi-
enced as being slightly later in mental time than in physi-
cal time, while the tone is experienced as occurring slightly 
earlier. This binding effect is reversed if the movement pre-
ceding the tone is involuntary, being caused by transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS). The involuntary movement 
and its ‘outcome’ are experienced as being further apart in 
mental than in physical time.
I suggest that the binding phenomenon at the heart of our 
experience of agency is essentially the same as the bind-
ing that occurs when we bring together colour, shape and 
movement in the perception of an object (Treisman 1996). 
In both cases, the effect of the binding, which happens at 
a sub-personal level (Di Lollo 2012), is to create a single 
phenomenological entity. The entity that forms our expe-
rience of agency is an action containing both an intention 
and an outcome. In consequence, our experience of this 
action is affected, not only by factors that exist before the 
action starts, but also by what happens after the action has 
been initiated (Moore et al. 2009). First, there is a predictive 
component. The time at which an action is experienced as 
being initiated is affected by prior expectations about the 
likelihood of the outcome. The time of initiating the action 
is perceived as later, if the outcome has been experienced as 
occurring 75 %, rather than 50 % of the time. Second, there 
is a post-dictive effect. In the case of a 50 % probability of 
the outcome, the time of initiating the action is experienced 
as occurring later in the cases in which it is followed by 
an outcome. Note that, in this example, the time at which 
people experience initiating an action is affected by an event 
that happens hundreds of milliseconds after the initiation.
I suggest that, as with all perception, the perception of 
agency depends on an (unconscious/sub-personal) infer-
ence based on prior expectations and on evidence from the 
senses (Helmholtz 1878). Expectations about agency can 
be learned through the repeated experience of contingen-
cies between intentions and outcomes, as in the experiment 
by Moore et al. (2009) just discussed, but they can also be 
derived from instructions. For example, participants in an 
experiment conducted by Dogge et al. (2012) were encour-
aged to experience themselves as the cause of a tone, even 
though the movements they made were involuntary. These 
instructions significantly increased the strength of inten-
tional binding.
As yet, little is known concerning the sensory evidence 
used to construct the sense of agency. However, one of 
the key sources of evidence seems to be the fluency with 
which the action is selected, rather than the quality of the 
subsequent performance. An action can be more easily and 
fluently selected after it has been primed. Participants expe-
rienced greater control over action effects when the action 
had been compatibly versus incompatibly primed (Chambon 
and Haggard 2012), even though they were unaware of these 
subliminal primes. I have already mentioned that subliminal 
action primes can influence behaviour in a free choice task 
(Kiesel et al. 2006). Subliminal action primes also increase 
the sense of agency associated with compatible choices in a 
free selection task (Linser and Goschke 2007), even though, 
in a sense, less ‘will’ is being exerted when participants 
choose the primed action.
Further evidence for the role of expectation and inference 
in the experience of agency is provided by the various illu-
sions that have been demonstrated. Such illusions can occur 
if strong expectations about contingency are violated. For 
example, after repeated exposure to a scenario in which a 
light flash usually occurred 135 ms after a key press, par-
ticipants experienced a light flash that occurred 35 ms after 
their key press as occurring before the key press (Stetson et 
al. 2006).
Wegner et al. have shown that an illusory experience of 
agency can arise merely because of a contingency between 
the intention to act and an appropriate outcome. Using a 
modern version of the Ouija Board, participants believed 
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that they had moved a cursor towards a location that they 
had just been primed to think about, even though the move-
ment had actually been caused by a stooge (Wegner and 
Wheatley 1999). The opposite illusion can also occur when 
people falsely believe they are not the agent of an action. 
This effect sometimes emerges during the use of facili-
tated communication (Wegner et al. 2003). This technique 
was developed to aid communication in the handicapped. 
A facilitator detects small movements in the hand of the 
person who is answering questions. For example, the hand 
might rest on a keyboard, but be too weak to press the keys. 
The facilitator amplifies these movements to generate the 
key presses desired by the communicator. The problem with 
this technique is that facilitators will firmly believe that 
they are reporting the answers of the communicator, even 
when the ‘communicator’ is a stooge who is making random 
movements (Wheeler et al. 1993).
That the experience of agency and volition is inferred 
from various sensory cues and prior expectations may 
account for the different ways in which the term agency is 
used. The various versions of the term place emphasis on 
different aspects of the experience. Libet (1985) emphasises 
precursors of action (the decision to act or not), Wegner 
(2005) emphasises the feeling of authorship (the sensation 
of being in control), Metcalfe and Son (2012) emphasise 
the judgement of being in control (the inference of being in 
control), while many (e.g. Aarts et al. 2005) emphasise the 
relation between action and outcome (having an effect on 
the world). As I shall argue below, the way we discuss the 
experience of agency is not simply a matter of terminology 
and emphasis. It can also have an effect on the way agency 
is experienced.
Agency, free will and responsibility
Whatever the precise mechanisms underlying its perception, 
volition, seen from the first-person perspective, is associ-
ated with a vivid experience of agency. As agents, we have 
the experience of desiring an outcome and of choosing the 
action that will achieve it. Some believe that it is this experi-
ence of being an agent that leads to a belief in free will. For 
example, Spinoza (1677) said, ‘Experience teaches us no 
less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be 
free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and 
unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are deter-
mined’. The implication is that this belief about free will is 
an illusion, a supposition supported by many, from Hume 
(1758) to Wegner (2003).
In contrast to this approach, I suggest that the impor-
tant feature of our awareness of agency is that it gives us 
a feeling of responsibility. I believe that research on voli-
tion will prove more tractable if we look at it in terms of 
responsibility rather than free will. My approach relates to 
earlier philosophical ideas, particularly those associated 
with Epicurus.
Responsibility, agency and regret
According to Epicurus, we acquire the idea that we are 
causal agents through the observation that human beings, 
including ourselves, are praised and blamed for their actions. 
Epicurus believed that our feeling of responsibility for our 
actions has two sources. First, there is the feeling that it was 
‘us ourselves’2 rather something else that caused the action. 
Second, there is the feeling that we could have chosen 
another action (Bobzien 2006).
The feeling that it was us ourselves that caused the action 
seems very close to the experience of agency discussed in 
the last section. The relationship between responsibility 
and agency has long been recognised and, more recently, 
has been studied experimentally. When asked about free 
will and responsibility, most people will respond, first, that 
we are only responsible for behaviour that is caused con-
sciously (i.e. associated with a sense of agency), rather than 
unconsciously (Shepherd 2012) and, second, that the more 
an actor is identified with an action, the more appropriate it 
is that responsibility should be assigned to that actor (Wool-
folk et al. 2006). When the experience of agency is meas-
ured directly using Haggard’s intentional binding paradigm, 
there is a greater sense of agency (i.e. more binding) when 
the consequences have a moral rather than a merely eco-
nomic content (Moretto et al. 2011).
The second basis for responsibility, proposed by Epicu-
rus, is the feeling that we could have done otherwise. It is 
this feeling that creates regret. ‘For it is on the grounds that 
it was possible for us also not to have chosen and not to have 
done this that we feel regret’.3 Regret must be distinguished 
from disappointment. We experience disappointment when 
the outcome of our action is worse than we expected. In 
contrast, we experience regret when we discover that an 
action that we could have chosen, but didn’t, would have 
obtained a better outcome than the one we actually chose.
The intensity of the regret we feel does not simply depend 
on the difference between what we achieved and what we 
might have achieved. It also depends on the extent to which 
we perceive ourselves to be the agent of the choice. For 
example, people believe that they would feel more regret 
if the regretted action was atypical, rather than habitual, or 
if the regretted action was one of commission, rather than 
omission (Guttentag and Ferrell 2004). Also, people report 
2
 (‘the cause from ourselves’, ‘that through ourselves’, Bobzien 
2006).
3
 (Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, Bobzien 1998).
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feeling more regret if the regretted action was the result of 
an individual decision rather than the majority decision of 
eight people, even though their choice conformed with the 
majority (Nicolle et al. 2011).
Feeling regret depends upon counterfactual reasoning. 
We are reflecting on what would have happened, if we had 
acted differently. We can also anticipate regret by reflect-
ing, in advance of the decision, on how we would feel if it 
turns out that we have made the wrong choice. Anticipated 
regret affects choice behaviour. This has been shown with 
auctions. In an auction, I will feel disappointment if my 
bid does not acquire the item I want. On the other hand, if 
I learn that my bid was only just below the winning bid, I 
will feel regret for not having bid higher. As a result, people 
make higher bids when they know that they will be told 
the winning bid if they lose, in comparison with auctions 
in which they are given no feedback about the other bids 
(Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007). Taking account of antici-
pated regret seems to require intact orbitofrontal cortex 
(Camille et al. 2004).
Responsibility and punishment
The concept of responsibility for action is of great impor-
tance, since, in most legal systems, only people who are 
responsible for their actions deserve punishment (see e.g. 
Goodenough 2004). In its turn, punishment is important 
because it has a critical role in stabilising society. For 
example, experiments in behavioural economics demon-
strate the importance of punishment in maintaining coop-
eration in social groups. Fehr and Gachter (2002) showed 
that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is 
applied to defectors by other members of the group, but 
breaks down if punishment is not possible. Because of 
the advantages of cooperation, in the long run people will 
choose to be part of an institution in which punishment 
is sanctioned, rather than one in which it is not (Gürerk 
et al. 2006).
However, the key point to be made here is that, at least 
in the setting of an economic game, punishment is only 
applied to those players who are considered to be respon-
sible for their actions. Punishment is not applied if partic-
ipants in the game have been told that a player is simply 
following printed instructions, even though the participant 
loses just as much money when confronted with the inten-
tional and the non-intentional player (Singer et al. 2004). 
Given the importance of distinguishing between intentional 
and unintentional acts, it is not surprising that the ability 
to make such a distinction seems to emerge very early, at 
between 6 and 9 months of age (Behne et al. 2005). Infants 
of 9 months reacted with more impatience when they failed 
to get a toy because it was withheld deliberately, rather than 
accidentally dropped.
The emergence of responsibility
I believe that, by discussing volitional behaviour in terms of 
responsibility rather than free will, empirical explorations 
about the emergence of such behaviour become much more 
tractable. For example, at various times in history, animals 
from insects to pigs were tried in court for their misdemean-
ours (Humphrey 2002), but today we take it for granted that 
non-human animals are not responsible for their actions. 
Likewise, we take it for granted that very young children are 
not responsible for their actions. The implication of these 
observations is that responsibility must emerge at some 
point both in evolution and in individual development.
When, precisely, this point is reached in development 
remains controversial. There are wide differences in the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility between different 
legal systems varying from 7 years (e.g. Switzerland) to 18 
years (e.g. Luxembourg, see Hazel 2008). There is currently 
much debate concerning the possibility that adolescents are 
not fully responsible for their actions since, at this age, the 
frontal lobes are still not fully mature (see e.g. Mackintosh 
2011).
This variability may relate to observation that different 
aspects of responsibility emerge at different ages. Only 
by the age of 5 can children report a mature experience of 
agency, distinguishing between a voluntary movement of 
the leg and a knee jerk reflex (Shultz et al. 1980). A true 
experience of regret seems to arise much later, at around the 
age of 9 (Rafetseder and Perner 2012). Prior to this age, chil-
dren base their judgements solely on what they got without 
taking into account what they could have got. Finally, there 
is some preliminary evidence that the excessive risk-taking 
behaviour seen in adolescence may be related to a lack of, 
or failure to take account of, anticipated regret (Gerrard et 
al. 1996). Thus, it seems that the ability to take regret into 
consideration, when making choices, continues to develop 
during adolescence (Habib et al. 2012).
The creation of responsibility
An obvious problem, when we take the first-person perspec-
tive in our studies of volition, is that we need our participants 
to be able to communicate to us their feelings and experi-
ences. Is this the reason why we do not assign responsibil-
ity to non-human animals and non-verbal infants? Is it that 
animals and infants have a rich experience of volition, but 
simply cannot tell us about it? This seems to me unlikely. 
The reports and behaviour of young children suggest that 
their experience of volition is different from that of adults. 
I suggest, therefore, that the ability to report and discuss 
the experience of action is not simply a window on voli-
tion. Rather, these explicit meta-cognitive abilities help to 
create our experience of agency and responsibility. In part, 
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this is because such discussions typically involve reflecting 
on what might have happened if we had acted otherwise. 
Counterfactual reasoning is thereby used to create a sense 
of responsibility. The experience of agency and responsibil-
ity is found only in humans, and only above about 5 years 
of age, because the emergence of such experience depends 
on the uniquely human faculties of counterfactual reasoning 
and explicit meta-cognition (Frith 2012).
Epicurus anticipated these ideas through his suggestion 
that we acquire the idea that we are causal agents through 
the observation that human beings, including ourselves, are 
praised and blamed for their actions (Bobzien 2006). In 
other words, how we experience volition is something that 
can be learned. As yet, there have been few empirical studies 
of this proposal, but I believe that what little evidence there 
is supports the idea. For example, I have already mentioned 
the study by Dogge et al. (2012) showing that intentional 
binding between involuntary actions and outcomes can be 
increased by teaching the participants to consider them-
selves as the cause of the effect, even when they are not.
A recent study reveals that instructions about the nature 
of action can also change behaviour. Job et al. (2010) told 
one group of participants, ‘Working on a strenuous mental 
task can make you feel tired such that you need a break 
before accomplishing a new task’ (limited resource condi-
tion), while another group were told, ‘Sometimes, working 
on a strenuous mental task can make you feel energized for 
further challenging activities’ (non-limited resource condi-
tion). These instructions altered behaviour such that the lim-
ited resource group made more errors on a STROOP task 
after performing a strenuous mental task, while the non-
limited resource group made fewer errors.4
My interpretation of this result is based on the idea that 
introspection is a very unreliable guide to the cognitive 
processes that underlie our behaviour (Nisbett and Wilson 
1977; Schwitzgebel 2008). It is becoming increasingly 
apparent that we are wrong if we think that, by consulting 
our intuitions, we can uncover the basic components of the 
cognitive engine that drives our behaviour and distinguish 
between the ‘basic model’ and the ‘optional extras’ that are 
formed by experience (Danziger 2006). After performing a 
strenuous task, our experience of action will change, but we 
will not be sure about what these changed sensations mean. 
As a result of this uncertainty, discussion with others can 
alter our interpretation and our response to our experiences 
of action. The experiment by Job et al. (2010) suggests how 
instructions might create an ‘optional extra’ for our experi-
ence of mental effort.
4
 Telling students that free will is an illusion also changes their 
behaviour. They are more likely to cheat on a test (Vohs and Schooler 
2008).
It follows from this argument that our experience of 
action should be subject to the effects of culture. There is 
some evidence that this is the case for the feeling of respon-
sibility. Among the Mopan Mayas of Central America, for 
example, both children and adults are punished accord-
ing to the outcome of their actions. Punishment is applied 
equally if the outcome is accidental, rather than deliberate. 
As a result, the defence of ‘I didn’t mean it!’ is considered 
irrelevant and is seldom attempted. This disregard for the 
mental states of actors is found at an institutional level and 
in everyday gossip. Saying a falsehood is not excused even 
if, at the time, the speaker believes it to be true, and children 
who indulge in pretend play are reproved (Danziger 2006). 
The experience of responsibility in this culture appears to be 
different from the experience in our culture.
Is there anything unique about human volition?
Volition looks very different from the first-person compared 
with the third-person perspective. From the third-person 
perspective, human volitional behaviour is clearly on a con-
tinuum with volitional behaviour in other species. Many 
creatures, including invertebrates, behave in ways that are 
not totally constrained by the immediate environment. In 
other words, the behaviour is generated ‘from inside’. Many 
creatures can behave unpredictably and even randomly. 
Humans differ only in that they have a greater flexibility in 
the endogenous generation of behaviour, especially in rela-
tion to novel behaviour. From this point of view, the idea of 
a uniquely human form of volition involving free will does 
not seem very plausible.
In contrast, at least in contemporary western cultures, 
when we take a first-person perspective, we are often viv-
idly aware of being the author of and therefore responsible 
for our actions. We can also be acutely aware of making 
choices and strongly believe that we could have done oth-
erwise. This difference between first- and third-person per-
spectives also influences our attitude to our own actions and 
those of others. Each of us believes that our own lives are 
more driven by free will than are the lives of others (Pronin 
and Kugler 2010): my behaviour is driven by my intentions 
and desires, while yours is driven by your personality, the 
situation and various unconscious biases. It is the first-per-
son aspect of volition that is uniquely human. We can only 
study this aspect of volition because people can describe 
their experiences. This is an ability found only in humans.
As I already mentioned, I do not believe that non-human 
animals have a first-person experience of agency, but are not 
able to tell us about it. I believe that they have no experi-
ence of agency. This is because the experience of agency 
is created by discussion with others. We do not have direct 
sensations of agency derived from specialised receptors. 
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Agency is something we experience on the basis of prior 
expectations and low-level sensations, such as selection flu-
ency and kinaesthetic feedback. There is evidence that such 
signals are also available to non-human animals, since many 
animals show preferences for actions that have an effect. For 
example, mice prefer to press a lever that moves rather than 
one that is stationary (Kish and Barnes 1961), and monkeys 
prefer to press a lever that turns on a light rather than one 
that has no effect (Moon and Lodahl 1956). However, the 
availability of such signal is not sufficient to create an expe-
rience of agency. The experience of agency requires that 
these signals be interpreted. Research is needed to identify 
more precisely the various kinds of sensory evidence that 
provide the basis for the experience of agency. It will also 
be important to know more about how malleable our inter-
pretations of these signals can be. For example, no amount 
of discussion can change our experience that the lines in 
the Muller-Lyer illusion are of the same length (Pylyshyn 
1999), but our experience of agency seems not to be so 
impenetrable. For example, there is the study from Dogge 
et al. (2012), mentioned above, in which the experience of 
intentional binding could be altered by suggestions that an 
involuntary action was causing an effect.
Can we be taught to reinterpret the sensory evidence 
associated with action? Consider, for example, the phenom-
enon through which we like something we have seen before 
even though we cannot remember seeing it before (Kunst-
Wilson and Zajonc 1980). The assumption, in this case, 
is that the sensation of perceptual fluency associated with 
something we have just seen is taken as evidence of liking, 
rather than familiarity (Bornstein and D’Agostino 1994). 
Could we learn to experience this fluency as familiarity? We 
need to explore further the mechanisms by which discus-
sions and instructions can alter our experience of perception 
and action (as in Job et al. 2010).
Culture and the experience of action
If our experience of action can be altered by teaching and 
instructions, then we would expect that the experience of 
agency might be different in different cultures. Indeed, as 
we have seen, there is some preliminary evidence for this 
(Danziger 2006), based on the way in which agency and 
responsibility are talked about and on how punishment is 
linked to action in the Mopan Mayas. It would be very inter-
esting to see whether experimental measures, such as inten-
tional binding, also indicated differences in the experience 
of agency in this culture.
I have previously suggested that the effects of culture on 
the experience of action depend on two mental phenomena 
(Frith 2012): first, that we can reflect on our experiences 
and positively enjoy discussing them with others and sec-
ond, that our introspections about these experiences are very 
unreliable (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Schwitzgebel 2008). It 
is precisely because of this unreliability of introspection that 
experiences can be changed through discussion.
One effect of discussion could be to make our introspec-
tion more accurate and reliable. For example, Bahrami et al. 
(2010) showed, through discussion of their visual experi-
ence, two people could arrive at a more accurate representa-
tion of the world than the best working on his own. In the 
same way, through discussion with others, we might come 
to a more accurate account of the sources of our actions than 
we can achieve on our own. This idea seems plausible, given 
that others may be more aware, than we are ourselves, of 
the various biases that affect our own behaviour (Pronin and 
Kugler 2010).
However, the effects of culture on our experience need 
not necessarily lead to a more accurate account of the cogni-
tive processes that generate our actions. For example, we can 
doubt whether our experience of being a causal agent and, 
hence, of being responsible for the outcomes of our actions 
accurately reflects the processes underlying our actions. 
Nevertheless, this experience is extremely important for 
generating social cohesion and advantages for the group. 
Perhaps, in this case, we should dispense with accuracy.
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